INTRODUCTION
A strong and growing body of research suggests that trust and reciprocity are central components to many mutually beneficial interactions in organizational life. Indeed, in many cases, social interactions take place sequentially, where one party incurs a cost before obtaining a benefit. In theory, a commitment to provide a future benefit can be governed by a formal contract or by a sanctioning system. In practice, however, imperfect monitoring, information asymmetries, moral hazard, and transaction costs often make the use and enforcement of binding mechanism infeasible. Hence one has to rely on the goodwill of the other party to reciprocate and honor trust (Arrow, 1974) .
To date, most research in this area conceptualizes and models trust as a psychological state or an action exhibited by an individual. In many organizational settings, however, decisions to trust or reciprocate are not made by individuals but by groups, committees, or management boards, who spend time examining an issue together in order to reach a group-level consensus decision via a collective process. This is especially true in modern organizations where teamwork is increasingly popular (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Hackman, 1987; Sundstrom, De Meuse, & Futrell, 1990) . Unfortunately, we know relatively little about whether or how intra-and inter-group dynamics influence intergroup trust and reciprocity relations as the vast majority of studies in this literature have focused primarily on individuals in the context of interpersonal interactions. Importantly, trust or reciprocity is inherently social as they must take place in a social interaction. Hence, trust and reciprocity decisions may be particularly sensitive to the social context of the interaction.
Indeed, studies focusing on the impact of social dynamics in and around groups have provided compelling evidence that group behavior is qualitatively different from individual behavior, and that individuals are prone to behave differently when they are in inter-group situations. For example, Insko and colleages (e.g., Insko, Pinkley, Hoyle, Dalton, Hong, Slim, Landry, Holton, Ruffin, & Thibaut, 1987; Schopler, Insko, Graetz, Drigotas, & Smith, 1991; Wilschut, Lodewijkx, & Insko, 2001) , using the Prisoner's Dilemma and other similar dyadic
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games, compared individual decisions with group decisions, where group decisions were operationalized by the majority vote of the group members on whether to cooperate or not.
These studies showed that intergroup relations are significantly more competitive and less cooperative than interpersonal relations, a finding labelled as the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. Group decision rules, majority and unanimity being the most common methods of social choice (Hare, 1976; Miller, 1989) , also have impact on the decision a group makes. For example, it is often more difficult to reach a group decision and require more discussion under the unanimity rule than under the majority rule (e.g. Castore & Murnighan, 1978; Miller, 1989) . However, the unanimity rule may also promote more careful examination of the decision matter and allow social influence to take place. In another study, Song (2004) compared trust and reciprocity interactions in situations when people were making decisions solely on their own behalf versus when they were given the responsibility to act on behalf of their groups. The results of the study suggested that people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision.
A primary goal of this paper is thus to investigate norms of trust and reciprocity exhibited by groups, charged with the task of making a consensus decision. For that purpose, I employ a simple, one-shot trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) that has been used frequently to study trust and reciprocity (e.g., Malhotra, 2004 , Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2004 Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2003) . The trust game captures a potentially profitable interaction for all parties involved, making it relevant to many forms of strategic interactions between individuals and groups within the same or different organizations, and organizations. First, I
examine and contrast the level of trust and reciprocity exhibited by individuals in inter-individual interactions with those made by groups in inter-group interactions. A group decision in this study is a consensus decision among group members and is reached via an intra-group discussion. The second research question deals with the role of beliefs and expectations, which are often considered as important predictors of behavior. There is evidence that people are insensitive and have difficulty accurately predicting about the cognition and behavior of others
(Messick, Moore, and Bazerman, 1997) . In this study, I compare actual trust / reciprocity behavior with forecasts for such behavior both at the individual and group level. Thus, I am able to examine whether groups have cognitive biases in regard to the discrepancy between forecast about one's own level of trust/reciprocity and those of others, the discrepancy between hypothetical self-forecast and other-forecast and the actual level of trust/reciprocity observed in the situation, and the underlying causes of such discrepancies if they indeed exist.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In the theory section below, I
provide some theoretical and empirical foundations and formulate some hypotheses. In the third section, I present the specifics of my study. Data analysis and the results of the study are presented in the fourth section. Discussions and conclusions are offered in the final section.
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Trust and Reciprocity Interaction: Theoretical and Experimental Framework
In trust and reciprocity relations, one's action prompts another's response, the anticipation of which in turn affects the first party's action. Hence, a game-theoretic approach, analyzing strategic decision situations with an explicit emphasis on exchange, conflict, and interdependence, is appropriate for studying such a phenomenon (Murnighan, 1994) . A widely employed game-theoretic experimental framework -the trust game (Berg, et al., 1995 ) is adopted in this research. The trust game is played as follows. Players are randomly assigned as either trustors or trustees and given an endowment at the beginning of the game. Each trustor must decide how much of his/her endowment to send to an anonymous counterpart (trustee). All players are informed that each dollar sent by the trustor will be tripled by the time it reaches the trustee. This tripling mechanism is designed as a way to model the essential characteristic of social exchange induced by trust: value generation. After receiving the money, each trustee decides how to split his/her wealth, i.e., the sum of his/her initial endowment plus the tripled amount received, between him/herself and the trustor as an act of reciprocity.
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In this game context, trustors can risk some and all of their endowment in hopes of achieving a better outcome if trustees act honourably; meanwhile trustees have a monetary incentive to exploit such trust. As such, this trust game models trust as a decision under risk, where the risk stems from social uncertainty: in particular, the possibility of either trustworthy or opportunistic behavior by the trustee. This conceptualization, in accordance with Rousseau and colleagues'
(1998) definition of trust, "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another" (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer, 1998, p.395) , reflects in a parsimonious way the mixed-motive nature of a trustful act: expecting that the other party will honor the trust while simultaneously making oneself vulnerable to exploitation. Specifically, trust is measured by the amount a trustor sends to a trustee. Similarly, reciprocity is measured by the ratio between the amount a trustee receives and the amount he/she sends back (Berg, et al., 1995) .
Another important theoretical feature of the trust game is that it explicitly disentangles two concepts that are sometimes treated as identical: trust, defined as the willingness to trust and measured by the amount sent by the trustor, and reciprocity, defined as the willingness to honor the trust received and measured by the ratio between amount sent by the trustor and the amount sent back by the trustee. In essence, the trust game is a prisoner's dilemma game played sequentially: the first player cooperates, exposing himself to possibly earning a lower payoff, and trusting the other player to reciprocate by cooperating back; the second player, having the knowledge of the first player's move, makes a contingent reciprocity decision. In prisoner's dilemma games, rational behavior, i.e. competition or defection, could be attributed to either greed (self-interest) or fear of non-cooperative behavior of the other party in the game. In this trust game, with the sequential mover feature, defection by the trustee could not be attributed to fear of non-cooperative behavior of the other party in the game but only to self-interest. In other words, reciprocity and self-interest are incompatible in the trust game and represent opposite poles of a continuum. Consequently, this game offers a richer structure than a simultaneous, Levine & Moreland, 1998 ). This phenomenon is attributed to the "truth wins" effect, meaning that a correct solution is most likely to be adopted by a group, even if it is advocated only by a single group member. For example, social psychological literature on group decision-making reported that groups are better decisionmakers than individuals with "eureka-type" problems (e.g. Shaw, 1936) .
Trust-and-reciprocity decisions, however, are not such "eureka-type" problems as decisions to trust / reciprocate are typically interactive, requiring both the ability to understand the strategic nature of the interaction and to anticipate the behavior of the interaction party (Kocher & Sutter, 2003) . In the growing literature of behavioral economics and experimental economics, a few studies using interactive decision games have been carried out to compare decisions made by groups in inter-group interactions and those made by individuals in analogous inter-individual interactions. In those studies, a group generally consisted of two or three individuals who communicated with each other to reach a common decision. Thus, the group manipulation in those studies is consistent with the group manipulation employed in this study. The results of such studies (e.g. Bone, Hey, & Suckling, 1999; Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; Bornstein, Kocher, Kugler, & Sutter, 2002; Bornstein, Kugler, Ziegelmeyer, 2002; Cox, 2002; Cox & Hayne, 1998) demonstrated that group decisions were generally closer to the game-theoretic equilibrium prediction than individual decisions i . If groups do behave in a more game-theoretic consistent manner in this trust game, then they will both send less and send back less than individuals, exhibiting a lower level of trust and reciprocity. (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Kramer, 1994; Kramer & Messick, 1998) . The evidence presented in these studies suggests a lower level of trust in inter-group interactions than in analogous interpersonal interactions, hence consistent with most of the findings reported in previous strategic game studies.
Hypothesis 1a -Groups will behave in a less trusting manner than individuals in the analogous situation.
Due to the mixed-motive nature of trust and reciprocity interaction, a trusting act is also a risky one because the other party may exploit such trust. Thus, it is possible that the motivation to trust has to do with the risk-taking motivation. Earlier studies on risk-taking have shown that it is not based on rational calculations alone (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . Most notably, Keynes speculated that taking risk requires optimism and so-called "animal spirits" (cf., Krueger & Dickson, 1994) . In line with Keynes's speculation, Krueger and Dickson (1994) , using a experimental decision-making game with salient financial rewards for performance, demonstrated that subjects who had higher self-efficacy, i.e., who believed in themselves, saw more opportunities in a risky choice and took greater risks. Small unitary groups, with their distinct intragroup social dynamics, may have higher efficacy in themselves than individuals do.
Such high efficacy in a unitary group setting in turn may lead to a higher risk-taking attitude.
Indeed, the "risk-shift" effect, reviewed by Myers & Lamn (1976) , and the "groupthink"
phenomena (e.g. Janis, 1972) already provide some evidence that groups tend to take greater risks than individual members acting alone. More recently, Tindale, Sheffey, and Scott (1993) reported that groups chose the riskier alternative even when a majority of the members favored the less risky alternative. Following this perspective, I contend that groups may behave in a more trusting manner because trust and risk-taking are closely related in this trust game. This hypothesis contradicts Hypothesis 1a.
Hypothesis 1b: Groups will behave in a more risk-taking and hence more trusting manner than will individuals in the analogous situation.
Inter-group versus Inter-individual Reciprocity
Given that trustees have a monetary incentive to exploit the trust they receive, reciprocity, honouring the trust received, is costly. Thus, reciprocity and self-interest are opposing motivations in this game. In explaining why groups were more competitive than individuals in prisoner's dilemma games, Insko and colleagues (1987) argued that the inter-group situation creates an illusion of social support for self-interest. Such social support, of course, is necessarily absent for individuals in interpersonal interactions. Hence, self-regarding behavior may increase and reciprocating behavior decrease in the context of an inter-group interaction.
Perhaps ironically, in such situations, people may have a self-serving belief that it is "altruistic"
to be self-interested on behalf of their group members and themselves. This argument seems to apply even more clearly within the context where a group decision is a unanimous decision made via intra-group discussion, where social dynamics are expected to play an even stronger role than in majority vote contexts. Echoing this view, Charness (2000) suggested that the group decisionmaking mechanism may also provoke the so-called "responsibility-alleviation" effect. The responsibility-alleviation effect suggests that the shift of responsibility for an outcome to an external authority impairs one's moral sentiments toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. Thus, a consensus group decision-making mechanism, arguably external to any individual decisionmaker, may dampen an individual group member's moral sentiment to honor the trust he/she receives. Hence, both the "social-support-for-self-interest" effect and the "responsibilityalleviation" effect lead to the group reciprocity hypothesis such that groups will exhibit a lower degree of reciprocity than individuals. This hypothesis is consistent with the rational group decision argument.
Hypothesis 2a: Groups will behave in a less reciprocating manner than as individuals in the analogous situation.
In contrast to the prediction stated in Hypothesis 2a, Cason and Mui (1997) , in a study using the dictator game ii , reported that group decisions were more other-regarding and less self-interested than individual decisions. The authors attributed this effect to normative social influence. Specifically, based on Social Comparison Theory (Festinger, 1954) , the authors suggested that people are motivated both to perceive and to present themselves as more favorable than what they believe to be the average tendency, a notion similar to the "better-than-average" or "holier-than-thou" bias. In line with this cognitive bias, they further conjectured that people will be motivated to observe the "norm" in their group during the group discussion and then adjusts their behavior to present him/herself in a more socially desirable manner. Given that both the trustee in the trust game and the dictator in the dictator game have the asymmetric power to divide the social wealth between themselves and the other party in the game, a trustee's decision is structurally equivalent to a dictator's decision in the dictator game. Thus, if group discussion, a form of intra-group interaction in which normative social influence takes place, led to socially more desirable behavior in a dictator game as reported in Cason and Mui (1997) , a higher reciprocity in groups may also be observed in the trust game. This is a competing hypothesis to Hypothesis 2a.
Hypothesis 2b: Groups will behave in a more reciprocating manner than individuals in the analogous situation.
Group Decision Biases
Earlier research has identified a number of pervasive cognitive errors that bias individual decision-making. The last theoretical issue investigated in this paper concerns whether groups also fall prey to the same cognitive biases found in individuals and, if so, the effects of such biases in trust and reciprocity relations. Previous research has shown that people often have idiosyncratic, self-oriented sets of evaluations and perspectives about the situation, making it difficult to assess accurately others' intentions and behavior (e.g., Bazerman, 1994; Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Snijders, 1996) . Indeed, research in strategic interaction has shown that individuals routinely think too little about others when making predictions about the outcomes of strategic interactions and when selecting strategies. For example, research on cognitive biases has suggested that people often overestimate the quality of their strategies and the likely outcomes of the strategic interaction for themselves (e.g., Bazerman, 1994) . Similarly, Song (2004) , using the same trust game, reported that people were poor at making accurate behavioural forecasts for themselves and others. Specifically, Song (2004) demonstrated that individual participants' behavioral forecasts of what they themselves would do had they been assigned as allocators (henceforth "self-forecasts") and analogous forecasts of what their allocators will in fact do (henceforth "other-forecasts") were significantly different from the actual behavior observed in the game, revealing a discrepancy between cognitions and actual behavior. Focusing on the effect of the group decision process on bias and bias correction, Tindale (1993) showed that a simple majority decision process either attenuated or exacerbated a particular bias, depending on how prevalent the bias was at the individual level.
This current research will look at the effect of the group consensus decision process on biases and bias attenuation.
The cognitive bias examined here is the positive illusion bias (Taylor, 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988) . Numerous studies have demonstrated that people typically believe that they are better than others in terms of desirable attributes, i.e., more selfless, kind, and generous, than others (e.g., Epley & Dunning, 2000; Miller & Ratner, 1998) . In investigating whether this "better-than-thou" bias is due to the fact that people overestimate their own attributes or underestimate those of others, some research has shown that people have unrealistically positive self-evaluations (Brown, 1986; Epley & Dunning, 2000) , while other research has suggested that people often have idiosyncratic, self-oriented sets of information and perspectives, making it difficult to accurately assess others' intentions and behavior (e.g., Bazerman, 1994; Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Snijders, 1996) . Following this stream of literature, this study will look at how accurate self-forecasts and other-forecasts are both at the individual level and the group level. Specifically, I examine whether individuals and groups in this study have a positive illusion that they are more trusting/trustworthy than those with whom they are playing. More importantly, I explore whether such a bias is caused by self-overestimation bias, other-underestimation bias, or a combination of both.
This leads to the following self-overestimation and other-underestimation hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3: For both individuals and groups, one's expectation about one's own level of trust / reciprocity will be higher than one's expectation of the other party.
Hypothesis 4: Compared to the actual behavior observed in the experiment, both individuals and groups will overestimate their own level of trust / reciprocity.
Hypothesis 5: Compared to the actual behavior observed in the experiment, both individuals and groups will underestimate the level trust/reciprocity of others.
METHODOLODY 3.1 Participants
Undergraduate business students at a large metropolitan University were randomly recruited in a cafeteria on campus. They were informed at the time of the recruitment that they would receive money for their participation and performance. A total of a hundred and forty-four students (84 men, 60 women) volunteered and received cash payments for participating in the experiment. Participants' average age was 20.4 (S.D. = 1.4).
Experimental Design and Procedure
Based on the experimental framework of the trust game, this study had a between-person manipulation, i.e. the random assignment of the trustor and the trustee role. This study also employed a within-person design of two experimental conditions: the inter-individual and the inter-group interactions, the latter case involved a group of three reaching a consensus group decision through an intra-group discussion. In the first half of the experiment, subjects played the trust game as individuals, with no knowledge about the second half of the experiment. After completing the inter-individual game, participants were randomly divided into groups of three.
In part two of the experiment, each group played the same game again as a group: subjects were asked to discuss with their group members and reach a consensus about how their group would act in the game. This specific order of the experimental conditions allowed me to measure individual members' initial decisions that were unaffected by group discussion or any other kind of group dynamics. Thus, the order of the two experimental conditions were not reversed and counter-balanced. In order to avoid possible confound of the specific ordering effect of the two conditions, the following procedures were implemented. First, participants were not told about the inter-group condition when they were completing the inter-individual condition. Neither were they informed that the inter-group condition was the last condition in the experiment when they were completing the inter-group condition. Second, the outcomes for the inter-individual condition were not revealed to the participants till the very end of the experiment (after they completed the inter-group condition and post-experiment questionnaire). However, due to the structure of the game, trustees always knew the result of an interaction as soon as they made their choice. Third, participants were informed at the beginning of the inter-group condition that there were two random pairings in the experiment, i.e. participants were matched with different people in the two experimental conditions.
For the inter-individual condition, all participants, both trustors and trustees, were endowed with $5. In order to keep the payoff parameter equivalent across experimental conditions, the endowment to the groups of three was the sum of all individual members' endowments and the payoff for each group was equally divided between the three individual members. The procedure and specifics of the experiment are described below.
When participants arrived at the experimental site, they were asked to pick an identification card out of a box. The identification card determined their participant codes and assignments as either "BLUE" or "RED" roles (trustor and trustee respectively). In order to avoid possible framing effects iii , the word "trust" was not mentioned at all during the experiment and the neutral terms BLUE and RED participants were used instead of terms such as trustor/trustee, sender/receiver, or partner/other. Participants were then escorted to the assigned BLUE or RED room where they stayed for the remainder of the experiment. Thus, trustors and trustees never met each other throughout the experiment.
Upon entering the respective rooms, all participants received the same general instructions about the trust game. They were informed that the experiment involved a game about social interactions, in which they would either play the "Blue" or the "Red" role. The game was illustrated with several numerical examples. The instructions were read aloud to the participants and they were then given time to ask questions. Participants were also told that they would remain anonymous during the experiment (they were only identified by their unique participant codes), and that they would get paid at the end of the game based on the decisions they made and those made by the person with whom they were paired (hereafter referred to as a player's counterpart) during the game. A decision record form was employed for trustors and trustees, who were seated in two separate rooms, to communicate their decisions to each other. The decision record forms were delivered in envelopes. There were three research assistants, two of whom stayed in the two rooms where participants were seated while the third sat in the control room recording all the decisions. This decision communication procedure ensured double-blind anonymity, an important experimental control to minimize self-presentation and social desirability effect.
In addition to the behavioral data, I also collected perceptual data on behavioral forecasts. In order to avoid cross-contamination of perception and behavioral data, trustees, who were asked to make a reciprocity decision behaviorally; were asked to hypothetically forecast how much they would send if they were in their counterpart's role (a measure of self-forecast of trust) and how much they forecast their counterparts would send to them (a measure of other-forecast of trust). In order to avoid the possible influence from the level of trust they received from the trustors, trustees were asked to fill out the questionnaire about self-and other-predictions about trust before they received the decision record. In other words, while trustees were waiting for the trustors' decision to arrive, they completed the behavioral forecasts questionnaire. Trustors, on the other hand, filled out the questionnaire after sending money to the trustees. Trustors were asked to give self-forecast and other-forecast of reciprocity, i.e. if they were to play the other role in the experiment, how much they would send back (self-forecast of reciprocity), as well as how much they forecast their other would send back (other-forecast of reciprocity).
In the inter-group condition, each group was encouraged to engage in a group discussion for as long as they wanted until they could reach a consensus. Each group also filled out one questionnaire together as a group as the group-level perceptual data. Having completed both conditions, participants were asked to go back to their individual seat and complete a short postexperiment questionnaire for demographic background information. Finally, participants were paid individually in the experimental control room to protect their anonymity. Each session took approximately 1 hour and participants earned on average $17. This amount is equivalent to or higher than an average wage of $8 to $10 an hour for work-study jobs on campus.
Experimental Manipulations, Independent and Dependent Variables
Based on this experimental framework, this study examined the effects of two manipulated factors. The first was a within-person factor: the individual versus group condition. The second was a between-person factor: the random assignment of participants to the trustor or the trustee role in the game. Trust and reciprocity behavior, self-forecast, and other-forecast of trust and reciprocity are the dependent variables. Trust behavior was measured by the amount sent by the trustor or trustor group. Reciprocity behaviour was measured by the ratio between the amount sent back by the trustee or trustee group and the amount sent by the counterpart trustor. Self-forecasts were measured by questionnaire responses as an individual and as a group representative to questions about how much one would do if he/she/ the group were in the counterpart role. Otherforecasts were measured by questionnaire responses about how much he/she/the group thought the counterpart would do.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Descriptive Data
A summary of the means and standard deviations across the two experimental conditions for the dependent variables were summarized Table 1 . For each condition, the table shows the amount sent by trustors as the measure of trust, the ratio between amount sent by the trustor and the amount sent back by the trustee as the measure of reciprocity, and the self-and other-forecasts about the level of trust /reciprocity in both experimental conditions. The results of this experiment, consistent with earlier studies, rejected the game-theoretic null hypothesis, showing that people do trust and reciprocate in a laboratory trust game with salient rewards.
Insert Table 1 .68, p < .001). However, no significant correlation was found between the mean of individual member reciprocity and group consensus reciprocity (r = .25, p < .23).
Having established the relationship between the mean of the individual member's initial preference and the group consensus, I then investigated the relative influence of each group member's initial decisions on the group consensus. In particular, the three group members'
individual preferences were first ranked as the highest, the median, and the lowest, and then were regressed independently on the group consensus. The following regression was run for both trust and reciprocity decisions: DV = 0 + 1 (Member low ) + 2 (Member median ) + 3 (Member high ) + (1) where the dependent variable is the group consensus decision on trust or reciprocity exhibited by the group and is a random disturbance term.
Insert Table 2 about here
As summarized in Table 2 , for trust decisions, the group consensus was best predicted by the cognitive biases has suggested that people often overestimate the quality of their strategies and the likely outcomes of the strategic interaction for themselves (e.g., Bazerman, 1994) . Such a cognitive bias may have occurred here. When asked to predict how much their counterparts would send back, rather than focusing solely on the trustworthiness of the other party, trustor groups may have actually focused on their own "better-than-average" strategies, thus overestimating the level of reciprocity of their counterparts! In sum, these results suggested that groups were no more superior than individuals as they also had the egocentric bias to perceive themselves to be "more-trusting/reciprocating-thanthou". In regard to prediction accuracy when hypothetical behavioral forecasts were gauged against actual behavior observed in the experiment, groups were better at making predictions about how much others would trust or what they themselves would do if they were in other's role than individuals. However, when it comes to reciprocity forecasts, the study revealed that grouplevel self-and other-forecasts were not consistent at all with actual group behavior exhibited.
DISCUSSION
Key Findings and Theoretical Implications
The goal of this paper was to examine and contrast trust and reciprocity at the individual and the group levels. I first examined trust and reciprocity behavior in the trust game, which has been widely used to study interpersonal trust and reciprocity interactions. The game-theoretic null hypothesis of the game states that players, whether individuals or groups, should send nothing as trustors and should send nothing back as trustees. Previous studies at the individual level demonstrated that people do not act in such a strictly "rational" way in this game. Once again, the results of this study provide little support for the game-theoretic null hypothesis as both individual and group trustors send nontrivial amounts to individual and group trustees, who in turn send nontrivial amounts back. Such results are generally consistent with past research using the trust game framework. The fact that neither individuals nor groups are much like those depicted by rational game-theoretic economic models expands our understanding of the strict descriptive utility of rational economic models in strategic interactions.
Second, I examined whether there was any difference in the level of trust and reciprocity exhibited by groups versus individuals. The results in this study suggest that, groups don't become more or less trusting, but are significantly less reciprocating when they were making a consensus decision. The finding that groups did not differ from individuals in the level of trust exhibited could be caused by the fact that a distrust shift, i.e. people have a lower level of trust towards a group versus an individual; and a risky shift, i.e., groups take greater risks and send more money to their counterparts; may have offset each other, leading to the non-significant difference between the level of trust exhibited by groups and by individuals.
The results of reciprocity at the group level stand in marked contrast to the trust results:
groups were significantly less reciprocating and more selfish. This is indeed consistent with the previous studies, which have shown that, although groups are not strictly "rational", they are more game-theoretic consistent than individuals. Furthermore, this result also supports the "responsibility-alleviation" argument (Charness, 2000) . In an earlier study of a resource allocation task, Murnighan, Oesch, & Pillutla (2001) found that participants acted in a more greedy way when they could attribute doing so to external causes. However, when such external attributions were unavailable, participants engaged in more fair-minded acts. The group reciprocity behavioral finding of this study is consistent with Murnighan et al.'s (2001) result.
This finding has a pertinent implication given the growing importance of managing complex interpersonal and intergroup ties within and between organizations and their members. As suggested in this study, inter-departmental and inter-firm partnerships and collaborations carry great opportunities as well as potential temptations and vulnerabilities. Cultivating and managing such relationships is essential to business as it provides a source of competitive advantage (Barney & Hansen, 1994) . Therefore, the ability to develop accountability in group decision-making processes and maintain a mutually beneficial relationship of trust and reciprocity is critical to modern organizational practices.
Third, I examined that relationship between individual members' initial preferences and the group consensus decisions. The analysis revealed that there was no significant difference between the group consensus trust decision and its members' individual decisions. However, the reciprocity exhibited by a group was significantly lower than that exhibited by its individual members. Similarly, there was a positive correlation between the level of the average individual member's trust and the group consensus trust, whereas no significant correlation was found between those for reciprocity. A further inquiry into the effect the relative impact of individual members' initial preferences on the group consensus decision revealed that, for trust decisions, the group consensus was best predicted by the median individual decision of the three member decisions. In contrast, no individual preference seemed to have a significant influence on the group reciprocity level.
Fourth, this study extends earlier research in this area by highlighting the role of expectations on reciprocity. Earlier research has demonstrated that individuals often focus only on their own side of the interaction and the perspective they take is often egocentrically biased (e.g., Gilbert & Jones, 1986; Tor & Bazerman, 2003) . Groups, like individuals, also believed that they were more trusting and reciprocating than others, demonstrating a positive illusion about themselves.
One interpretation is that, when it comes to individual "better-than-average" biases, they are not corrected by the group discussion. More importantly, trustor groups significantly overestimated their counterpart's level of reciprocity. One interpretation of this overestimation effect could be trustor groups' cognitive bias of their "better-than-average" strategy. This intriguing finding represents a potentially important extension by demonstrating that groups are also the victim of the "focus-of-attention" problem as they also only focus only on their own side of the interaction and the perspective they take is, unknowingly, egocentrically biased. In general, this study demonstrated that the egocentric biases not only exist at the individual level, but at the group level as well.
Previous research has shown that exposure to others can reduce egocentric cognitive biases (Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996) . In the current research, participants were not only asked to hypothetically predict what they themselves would do if they were in their counterpart's shoes, and what they thought their counterpart would do, but were also asked to discuss group prediction with their group members. However, intra-group discussion did little to correct such cognitive biases. The prediction biases reported in this study are remarkable in their pervasiveness on both sides of the interaction and at both the individual and group level, even in the face of salient and material incentives to do well and despite intra-group peer discussion. As a result, an important area of future research should focus on developing prescriptive research that can attenuate such biases both at the individual and group level.
Limitations and Future Directions for Research
Laboratory experimentation, with its particular strength in creating conditions that are a priori specified in the theory, is an important compliment to survey studies and field studies. In this study, the clarity of the experimental task, the powerful and parsimonious contrast of the differing levels of trust/reciprocity in the individual and group conditions, and the availability of objective measures of trust and reciprocity judgments and behaviours combine to make this a powerful method to study trust and reciprocity interactions at both the individual and group level. However, this methodology does have limitations.
First, the laboratory nature of the task and the starkness of the interactions necessarily limit the direct generalizability of the findings to complex organizational settings. The logic of experimentation requires us to eliminate or control for all possible influences other than the factors under investigation. In contrast, outside the laboratory doors, people are influenced simultaneously by many factors. Hence, a monetary allocation to an anonymous recipient, designed as a measure of trust and reciprocity behavior in an experiment, reflects just one aspect of the multi-faceted nature of such interaction in the real world. Therefore, field studies are an important complement to laboratory research on the role of trust and reciprocity norms and expectations in organizational settings both at the individual and group level.
In addition, trust and reciprocity are intimately related: trust leads to reciprocity; and reciprocation of an initially trusting act can instigate a beneficial cycle of increasing trust and reciprocation. In contrast, exploiting trust can seriously damage a relationship and weaken its prospects. The one-shot nature of the game in the current study did not allow me to examine the complex effect of interaction on both trust and reciprocity. For example, had trustor groups received a beneficial level of reciprocity from their counterpart groups, they might have rationally changed their strategy in the following round. Similarly, trustee groups may not have acted in such an untrustworthy way if the game had been played more than once. Following this logic, it is essential for researchers to conduct multiple-rounds trust games or field longitudinal studies in order to examine how trust and reciprocity relationships evolve and develop in intergroup relations as well as to study what factors within and across groups may enhance or weaken inter-group trust and reciprocity. It is possible that in a multi-round setting, "the shadow of future" (Alexrod, 1984) may help develop a mutually beneficial cycle of high trust and reciprocity, resulting in higher levels of trust and reciprocity than what observed in this one-shot setting. Similarly, future research could also shed much light on the complex nature of grouplevel decision-making process by studying the process of the group consensus formulation.
Exploring important intervening, mediating, and moderating variables that impact on the shift of the group consensus from initial group member preferences would indeed further our understanding on this issue.
Another limitation of this study is the ad hoc nature of the experimental groups and the relatively small group size employed in the group-level treatment. The expected sentiments and feelings towards group members with whom one was randomly paired for a one-hour experimental game may not be salient enough for subjects drastically to change their behavior. It focus on trust and reciprocity relations. In particular, this paper investigates norms of trust and reciprocity exhibited by groups via a group consensus decision process. The experiment reported here was designed to examine whether groups would trust /reciprocate more (or less)
when they must reach a consensus decision than individuals. The experiment also allowed me to examine the behavioral forecasts individuals and groups have for themselves and others.
Both theoretically and practically, this paper makes a number of important contributions. In terms of theory advancement, this paper integrated the trust literature and research on social dynamics and group relations. In particular, this research suggests that it is misleading to assume that trust and reciprocity relations between groups are identical to those in interpersonal relations. Indeed, the results of this study show, in a carefully controlled way, that interpersonal and intergroup trust and reciprocity are not to be treated as identical and interchangeable.
Furthermore, it sheds light on the importance of carefully considering the level of analysis when theorizing about the role of trust and reciprocity in organizational settings. Therefore, this study adds important insights to the growing literature on linkages between units at different levels of analysis.
In regard to its practical implications, the findings of this research are especially pertinent given the growing importance of managing complex interpersonal and intergroup ties within and between organizations and their members. The proliferation of team-based production and management as more flexible forms of organization calls for the ability to build and maintain mutually beneficial working relationships within and across organizational boundaries (Child & McGrath, 2001) . Such inter-departmental and inter-firm partnerships and collaborations carry great opportunities as well as potential temptations and vulnerabilities as demonstrated in this research. As a result, the ability to develop, foster, and maintain a mutually beneficial relationship of trust and reciprocity at the group and organizational level is critical to modern organizations. The second major practical implication highlights the importance of perspectivetaking abilities. This research suggests that effective managers are those who are able to see and understand interactions and relations not only from their own perspective, but from their counterpart's as well. Specific advice derived from the findings of this study include to take into account situational forces and be more attentive to the factors that are important to the other party in order to maximize both the individual and joint gains of interactions. There are also a few notable exceptions to this general finding. For example, Cason and Mui (1997) showed that two-person groups who must reach a joint consensus decision gave away significantly more in a dictator game than did the same two people playing individually, indicating a further deviation from gametheory predictions.
ii The dictator game involves only a simple act of a participant (the dictator or allocator) dividing a resource, typically money, between him/herself and a passive recipient.
iii Burnham, McCabe, and Smith (2000) conducted an experiment using the trust game to examine the specific framing effect that human subjects have a preconscious friend-or-foe (FOF) mental mechanism for evaluating the intentions of another person. In their experiment, instructions were used to weakly prime the FOF state: when referring to the person that an individual is matched with, the word "partner" was used in one treatment and "other" in the other. This treatment produced a significant difference in trust and trustworthiness behavior in repeated interactions over time. Trustworthiness with "partner" was over twice that for "opponent" and this reinforced trust.
